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Comment on: Likelihood ratio as weight of forensic evidence: a
closer look
(S.P. Lund and H. Iyer; Journal of Research of National Institute of Science
and Technology, 2017.)
A recent article (Lund and Iyer, 2017) provides, in the words of its title,
a closer look at the likelihood ratio as the weight of forensic evidence. This
note comments critically on two aspects of the article.
The first aspect concerns two related statements. In the abstract the
statement is made that ‘[W]e find the likelihood ratio paradigm to be un-
supported by arguments of Bayesian decision theory, which applies only to
personal decision making and not to the transport of information from an
expert to a separate decision maker’. The idea presented in this statement
of lack of support for the likelihood ratio as a means of transport of infor-
mation is repeated in the conclusion where it is stated that ‘. . . we hope
the forensic science community comes to view the LR as one possible, not
normative or necessarily optimum, tool for communicating to DMs (decision
makers)’ (Lund and Iyer’s emphasis). Despite this opinion of these authors,
it was shown many years ago by I.J.Good in two brief notes in the Journal
of Statistical Computation and Simulation (Good, 989a,b) repeated in Good
(1991) and in Aitken and Taroni (2004) that, with some very reasonable
assumptions, the assessment of uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of ev-
idence leads inevitably to the likelihood ratio as the only way in which this
can be done.
In order to show that the likelihood ratio is the only way to evaluate
evidence, it is necessary to introduce some mathematical notation. This is
a device to ease the presentation of the argument. The argument could be
made verbally but would be lengthy and more difficult to follow. Consider
evidence E which it is desired to evaluate in the context of two mutually
exclusive propositions Hp and Hd. Denote the value of the evidence by V .
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Of course, this statement makes the implicit assumption that evidence has
a value that can be measured. The value will depend on background infor-
mation I. So, four and only four factors have been introduced, E,Hp, Hd
and I. Further, V is a function of these four factors, V = f(E,Hp, Hd, I).
Admitting that there is uncertainty about E and committing to analysing
it probabilistically, using the argument of conditional probability, leads to
f(E | Hp, Hd, I)f(Hp, Hd, I), rather than forms such as f(Hp | Hd, E, I) or
variants of it. The expression f(Hp, Hd, I) does not involve the evidence,
which reduces considerations further to f(E | Hp, Hd, I). Propositions Hp
and Hd are mutually exclusive so if E is to be a function of both Hp and Hd
then f(E | Hp, Hd, I) is a combination of two functions, one that involves
Hp and not Hd and one that involves Hd and not Hp. Value may thus be
expressed as a function of the probabilities of E given Hp (and I) and of E
given Hd (and I). Again, this makes implicit assumptions, namely that there
is a probability that can be associated with evidence and that is dependent
on a proposition and background information. For ease of notation explicit
mention of I will be omitted from notation in what follows.
Let x = Pr(E | Hp) and y = Pr(E | Hd). The assumption that V is a
function only of these probabilities can be represented mathematically as
V = f(x, y)
for some function f .
Now, consider another piece of evidence T which is irrelevant to E, to Hp
and to Hd. Irrelevance is taken in the probabilistic context to be equivalent
to independence so that T may be taken to be independent of E, of Hp and
of Hd. It is then permissible for Pr(T ) to be given notation which does not
refer to any of E,Hp or Hd. Thus, let Pr(T ) be denoted by θ. Then
Pr(E, T | Hp) = Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T | Hp) by the independence of E and T
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T ) by the independence of Tand Hp
= x θ.
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Similarly,
Pr(E, T | Hd) = y θ.
The value of (E, T ) is f(θx, θy) by the definition of f . However, evidence
T is irrelevant and has no effect on the value of evidence E. Thus, the
value of the combined evidence (E, T ), f(θx, θy), is equal to the value V of
E, f(x, y), and
V = f(x, y) = f(θx, θy)
for all θ in the interval [0,1] of possible values of Pr(T ).
The only class of functions of (x, y) for which this can be said to be the
case is the class which are functions of x/y or
Pr(E | Hp)/Pr(E | Hd)
which is the likelihood ratio. Hence the value V of evidence has to be a
function of the likelihood ratio. Lund and Iyer wish the forensic community
to view the likelihood ratio as one possible tool for communication with de-
cision makers. We hope that we have shown here through the argument of
Good that it is the only logically admissible form of evaluation. Incidentally,
note that no recourse has been made to arguments of Bayesian decision the-
ory. The support of these arguments for the likelihood ratio paradigm, as
suggested in the abstract, is not necessary.
The second aspect is minor and concerns a definition. The concept of
weight of evidence is an old idea. The term weight of evidence for the log-
arithm of the likelihood ratio was given by Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce,
1878). It is not the likelihood ratio that should be referred to as the weight
of evidence as is done in the title of the article. It is better to refer to the
likelihood ratio as the value of the evidence and its logarithm as the weight
of the evidence. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio has the pleasingly intu-
itive operation of additivity when converting the logarithm of the prior odds
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in favour of a proposition to the logarithm of the posterior odds in favour of
the proposition.
log
{
Pr(Hp | E)
Pr(Hd | E)
}
= log
{
Pr(E | Hp)
Pr(E | Hd)
}
+ log
{
Pr(Hp)
Pr(Hd)
}
. (1)
When considering the scales of justice it is the logarithm of the probabilities
of the evidence given each of the two competing propositions that should be
put in the scales, not the probabilities. Equation (1) can be rewritten as
log{Pr(Hp | E)} − log{Pr(Hd | E)} =
log{Pr(E | Hp)} − log{Pr(E | Hd)}+ log{Pr(Hp)} − log{Pr(Hd)}
= [log{Pr(E | Hp)}+ log{Pr(Hp)}]− [log{Pr(E | Hd)}+ log{Pr(Hd)}]
Expressions to the left of the negative sign in the last line are associated
with one pan in the scales, expressions to the right with the other pan. Thus
log(Pr(E | Hp)) is added to the prior log probability for Hp in one scale and
log(Pr(E | Hd)) is added to the prior log probability for Hd in the other
scale. The difference in the sums of the two pairs of log probabilities is a
more intuitive characteristic of the evidence to which the term weight may be
applied than the ratio of the probabilities of the evidence given the respective
propositions.
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